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Attitudes to public spending on environmental risk reduction: The role 
of temporal and spatial distance 
 
Climate change is often perceived as a distant threat affecting people in distant 
places and the far future. Such perceptions could dampen public willingness to 
spend on climate mitigation. We contribute to the knowledge on attitudes to 
public spending on environmental risk reduction by designing a survey 
experiment that disentangles two dimensions of distance—spatial and temporal—
and examines these dimensions for two different, but related, environmental 
risks: climate change and air pollution. Consistent with previous research on 
climate change, we find somewhat more favourable attitudes in scenarios that 
allow delaying the planned spending. This pattern is, to a degree, present for both 
types of environmental risks examined.  With regards to spatial variation, 
however, we find that the type of environmental risk being addressed matters for 
how the public responds to the variations in distance. In the case of air pollution, 
attitudes to public spending are more favourable in the spatially proximate 
condition. In the case of climate change, the difference points in the opposite 
direction. These patterns are strongest in the immediate scenarios, but they also 
hold irrespective of temporal distance, and is not driven by any particular 
political ideological subset of respondents. 
 




Although environmental problems are generally considered important by the public in 
Western countries (Capstick et al. 2015), citizens sometimes assign only low policy 
priority to them compared to other issues (Leiserowitz 2006). For example, in the 
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context of climate change, Leiserowitz (2006) finds that two-thirds of Americans in a 
national survey were most concerned about impacts on people around the world and on 
non-human nature, against only 13% emphasizing effects on themselves or their local 
communities. This is one of many findings that climate change is often perceived as a 
threat, but a remote one, affecting people in distant places or the distant future (Liu, Xie, 
and She 2014; Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006; Lujala, Lein, and Rød 2015 for Norway; 
Scannell and Gifford 2013). As Vlek (2000) argues, people tend to prioritize the ‘us 
here and now’ and can better assess short-term costs and benefits. Environmental 
problems are also a good example of a social dilemma, as the short-term benefits of 
environmental exploitation tend to be perceived as more valuable than the long-term 
benefits of protection (Harring and Jagers 2013). It follows that individuals would not 
want to pay the costs which would be imposed by actions taken immediately, and would 
prefer to delay the payment and thus the action itself. This is even more the case if the 
benefits are perceived to be long-term and affecting future generations rather than 
people living at present. All in all, the sense of far-distant risks and dangers of climate 
change, as well as far-distant benefits of mitigating it, to all appearance contributes to 
the propensity to delay costs and hence the action.  
At the same time, unanswered questions remain about the role of spatial and 
temporal distance as regards policies to reduce environmental risks of various types. 
First, while the literature has accumulated a considerable amount of evidence of the role 
of distance in risk perception and worry, less is known about the effects on willingness 
to spend money on risk reduction. Second, we do not know enough about whether 
temporal and spatial distance effects are generic for all environmental problems, or 




In this paper, we address these questions using a 2*2*2 factorial survey 
experiment, varying temporal and spatial distance as well as the environmental problem 
presented. We find that the effect of geographical distance depends crucially on whether 
the scenario involves air pollution or climate change. Specifically, scenarios involving 
measures reducing climate change risk globally garner more support than national 
measures. By contrast, nationally focused air pollution risk mitigation policies receive 
greater endorsement than globally oriented policies. The results regarding temporal 
distance indicate a preference for delayed action, except if the risk is air pollution and 
the spatial distance is proximate. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we review the literature on the role of 
distance in environmental risk perception and preferences and briefly present Norway as 
a case. We then present our methods and data. The subsequent results section presents 
the outcome of the survey experiment and displays the effects across three categories of 
individual ideological self-placement on a left-right scale. We then discuss the results 
and conclude with some implications for environmental risk communication and policy 
design.  
 
The role of temporal and spatial distance in environmental opinion 
Some authors (e.g. Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, and Whitmarsh, 2007) argue in favour 
of framing climate change in local terms to enhance mitigation and adaptation 
responses. Devine-Wright and colleagues (2013; 2015) challenge this claim by pointing 
out the relevance of global, not only local, place attachment in climate change 
perceptions, and ask whether public engagement with climate change could ‘arise from 
global as well as local concerns’ (p. 68).  
4 
 
In fact, the role of psychological distance in climate change perception is far 
from thoroughly explored and understood (McDonald, Chai, and Newell 2015). Climate 
change may indeed be perceived as distant threat on multiple levels – spatially, 
temporally, socially, and as hypothetical or abstract (more on the concept of 
psychological distance e.g. Newell et al. 2014; Pahl et al. 2014; Scannell and Gifford 
2013; Spence, Poortinga, and Pidgeon 2012). However, such perceived remoteness or 
abstraction does not necessarily mean that the issue elicits a weaker emotional or 
behavioural response. It may actually be quite the opposite – people are generally more 
optimistic regarding the risks climate change may pose to them personally (Pahl et al. 
2014) but tend to perceive the geographically or temporally more distant threats as more 
serious (Spence and Pidgeon 2010). Consequently, some studies suggest that 
willingness to act on climate change is higher if the impacts are perceived as severe and 
distant (see McDonald, Chai, and Newell 2015 for a review).  
On the other hand, there is some evidence that parts of the population tend to 
place less value on outcomes that are temporally distant, uncertain or occurring to others 
(Gattig and Hendrickx 2007, Nicolaij and Hendrickx 2003). In some studies, no effect 
of temporal distance is found (Böhm and Pfister 2005). In sum, the evidence on the 
issue is somewhat mixed. 
Furthermore, some studies indicate that different social groups, based on their 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics, may differ in their assessment of 
different policy measures (e.g. financial incentives, information strategies, regulation 
etc.) and policy scenarios. These differences have been identified for gender (McCright 
2008), education (Hammar and Jagers 2006), income (Coad, de Haan, and Woersdorfer 
2009), and political orientation or party preference (Devine-Wright, Price, and Leviston 
2015; Hart 2011; Konisky, Milyo, and Richardson 2008). With respect to the latter, 
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information about policy scenarios can be evaluated and interpreted within specific 
political discourses relevant to respondents’ political orientations.  
Political orientation, for example, is apparently far more important in the 
formation of policy attitudes than provision of additional information or policy framing 
(Carrico, Truelove, Vandenbergh, and Dana 2015). Hardisty, Johnson, and Weber 
(2009, p. 6), for example, report labelling effect conditional on party identification in 
the United States. Participants identifying as Democrats were not sensitive to whether a 
suggested policy was labelled ‘tax’ or ‘offset’, but Republicans responded negatively to 
the label ‘tax’. This result led the authors to conclude that ‘the power of a framing 
manipulation can depend on participants’ pre-existing differences’. Furthermore, 
Rickard, Yang, and Schuldt (2016) conclude that varying the stipulated scenario year by 
which climate impacts would be felt - between 2020, 2047, and 2066 - barely affected 
policy support in the aggregate, but did produce effects when interacting with political 
orientation. Notably, US conservatives responded significantly more positively to 
scenarios that were spatially more proximate and temporally more distant. Lu and 
Schuldt (2015, 2016) also report that the link between emotions and policy attitudes is 
conditional on political orientation. 
A positive association of attitudes toward climate change mitigation policies 
with left (US: liberal) political orientation, as well as backing green parties, is supported 
by robust evidence, although rare exceptions are present (Drews and van den Bergh 
2015; Zvěřinová, Ščasný, and Kyselá 2014). Although Democrats seem more likely 
than Republicans to form positive attitudes toward climate actions in the US (Bannon, 
DeBell, Krosnick, Kopp, and Aldhous 2007 on samples representative of adult 
population; McCright, Dunlap, and Xiao 2013; O’Connor, Bord, Yarnal, and Wiefek 
2002 on sample of residents of Pennsylvania; Wiest, Raymond, and Clawson 2015), the 
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effect is not universal. Stoutenborough, Bromley-Trujillo, and Vedlitz (2014), for 
example, find statistically significant positive effect of sympathising with Democrats on 
attitudes toward policies that would increase the prices of fossil fuels. The positive 
effect of identification with the Democratic Party was accompanied by a negative effect 
of identification with the Republicans. Such negative effect was present also for 
industrial taxes and the aggregated measure of all policy options, although it was not 
accompanied by the opposite positive effect of self-identification as a Democrat. For 
other analysed policies, namely market incentives, support for renewable energy, and 
increased fuel efficiency, no statistically significant effects of identification with either 
party were reported in the study. Effects of political orientation are therefore hardly 
straightforward.  
At the same time, there are not many studies exploring the relationship of 
political orientation and policy attitudes outside the US. One exception is the recent 
work by Poortinga et al. (2019), who find that political orientation effects on levels of 
climate skepticism and concern about climate change are generally weaker in Central 
and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. 
The discussion so far has identified three gaps in the literature that need to be 
filled. First, it remains to be answered, whether it is the tendency to see climate change 
as a temporally distant threat due to the actual long-term character of climate change, 
which operates on decadal scales, or whether it is due to a latent general preference to 
postpone action for as long as possible. Here we assume that defining a problem as near 
in time also implies a need for near-term action, and thus that resistance to near-term 
action may lead to a redefinition of the problem to a long-term one. Postponement of 
action may thus constitute a type of ‘solution aversion’ (Campbell and Kay, 2014). At 
the same time, earlier literature has shown that people distinguish between air pollution 
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and climate change on the dimensions of their respective causes and impact 
(Tvinnereim et al., 2017) – our research will also examine whether similarly differential 
effects may be found for policy attitudes toward both issues.  
Second, the evidence for perceived spatial and temporal distance in climate 
change risk perception and worry is strong. It is not clear, however, whether such 
effects also hold in the context of policy attitudes. Specifically, do temporal and spatial 
difference effects appear when evaluating policies that are to take place here and now 
versus globally and in the future?  
Third, we ask how well the role of ideology in environmental risk perception 
travels outside the US. Since a disproportionate share of the literature combining study 
of political polarization and environmental public opinion builds on studies conducted 
in the US, data from other countries are needed to establish whether current 
generalizations are valid or simply an artefact of exceptional American circumstances.  
 The study we describe in this paper aims to answer these three research 
questions using a three-dimensional survey experiment. First, we examine the stability 
of responses in relation to temporal and spatial attributes of policy scenarios in the case 
of public funding of climate change or air pollution risk reduction. More specifically, 
we examine whether there is a more positive evaluation of scenarios distant in time and 
space, or whether there would be any tendency to evaluate home-based scenarios more 
favourably. Importantly, we also ask whether these effects will be conditional on the 
environmental issue at hand. If distance effects are mostly caused by general solution 
aversion, the findings for climate change and air pollution should be similar. 
Conversely, a finding of divergent effects of the two different issue treatments would 




Second, and relatedly, we seek to establish whether temporal and spatial 
distance effects, which have been shown for risk perception and worry, also apply to 
different policy scenarios in space and time.  
Third, we investigate whether these effects for the two issues are conditional on 
political orientation in a non-US context – specifically, Norway. We furthermore ask 
whether there is any polarization conditional on the characteristics of the scenarios. In 
other words, we ask if some funding scenarios are more likely than others to polarize 
the public along the lines of political orientation. 
Altogether, the goal of this study is to find out whether more positive stance on 
delayed action and distant or homeland risk reduction of two different environmental 
problems is different and if it is conditional on political orientation. In consequence, the 
tendency to evaluate delayed action more positively than immediate action may be 
relevant only for some environmental issues and some segments of the population. It 
may, as well, be polarizing only in specific conditions, rather than universally.  
  We compare two related environmental issues, which can be construed 
differently – climate change and local air pollution. Air pollution is, by the nature of 
both problems, closely interlinked with climate change. Among other things, nitrogen 
oxide (NO2), sulphur oxide (SO2) and other pollutants such as particulate matter often 
co-occur with carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Consequently, mitigation of climate 
change through the reduction of fossil fuel combustion typically has positive effects on 
air pollution as an ancillary benefit. The perception of both issues by the public is 
related as well, since people often perceive air pollution as the cause of climate change 
or global warming (Whitmarsh 2009). Whitmarsh (2009) even suggests using the link to 
air pollution to gain more public interest and increase motivation to act. Moreover, 
citizens may also associate certain level of policy making as appropriate for certain 
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problems. Air pollution could be seen as best solved on local level, while climate 
change, as a global process, would be seen as best tackled on global policy level. 
Consequently, one may expect that public spending on air pollution will gain 
affirmative attitudes more often but still be subject to some of the distance effects found 
for climate change. 
Norway as a case 
Norway is a suitable country for answering our research questions, as both air pollution 
and climate change have been high on the public agenda in recent years. Furthermore, 
the political system is relatively consensus-based (Lijphart, 1999), providing a useful 
contrast to the more polarized US.  
Despite its image as a country of clean air and water, Norway has struggled with 
local air pollution in several cities and regions. Levels of air pollution from road traffic, 
residential wood burning, industrial activity and shipping have at times reached 
hazardous levels and surpassed EU limits on ambient air pollution. In 2015, the 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) court found Norway in breach of EU 
Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for SO2, NO2 and 
particulate matter (PM10).
1 The court also found that Norway had failed to produce 
adequate air quality plans as required by European law.  
Furthermore, and in contrast to many other European countries, Norway’s 
greenhouse gas emissions have increased from 1990, the base year for emission 
 
1  Case E-7/15, ESA v Norway [2015] EFTA Ct. Rep. 568 
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accounting under the Kyoto Protocol.2 A major reason for this failure to cut emissions is 
the country’s petroleum industry, which causes a dilemma between Norway’s wish to 
appear as environmentally friendly while accumulating massive wealth from the export 
of fossil fuels (Norgaard, 2006). Relatedly, there is some evidence that certain types of 
climate scepticism among the Norwegian public are at the high end among 
industrialized countries (Tranter and Booth, 2015; Poortinga et al, 2019), although other 
studies show a more nuanced picture (Steentjes et al., 2017).  
Methods 
Data 
Data from the second wave of the Norwegian Citizen Panel (2014) are analysed in this 
study. The Norwegian Citizen Panel is an infrastructure for Internet-based public 
opinion research, owned by the University of Bergen and exclusively used for academic 
purposes. The panellists were recruited prior to the first wave of the panel via random 
selection from the national population registry. A total of 4,905 respondents answered 
the first wave and 3,372 answered the second. Respondents were randomly assigned to 
two groups answering different sets of questions (see Supplementary Materials for the 
codebook, design and question wordings). A subset of Wave 2 respondents was selected 
for the current study, yielding 1,714 observations overall. These were further 
randomized into eight groups. Due to drop-out issues in the panel data, sampling biases 
 
2  The increase was approximately 3% from 1990 to 2017. Source: “Kvotepliktige og ikke-
kvotepliktige utslipp av klimagasser,” Norwegian Environment Agency, dated 12 Dec 2018, 
https://www.miljodirektoratet.no/no/Tema/klima/Klimagasser/Kvotepliktige-og-ikke-
kvotepliktige-utslipp-av-klimagasser/ , accessed 14 Feb 2019.  
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are present in the analysed sample. Namely, younger and less educated citizens are 
underrepresented (see Table 1 in Online Appendix A) and older and well-educated 
citizens are somewhat overrepresented. Models were run with both the weighted and 
unweighted data, producing substantively similar results. We therefore present 
unweighted data in the analyses below.  
There were no statistically significant differences between the eight randomized 
groups with respect to the region of residence, education, age group, and gender (with a 
slight statistically significant overrepresentation of men in one of the groups; see Table 
1), as well as perceived seriousness of climate change and other related attitudes (tested 
by Spearman’s rho). There were some statistically significant differences with respect to 
the political orientation of the respondents (see Table 1) both between randomized 
groups and between one resulting experimental treatment (spatial attribute). Those 
oriented to the right side of the political spectrum are overrepresented by 6% in the 
condition now. As political orientation is an explanatory variable in one of our models, 
these differences are accounted for in that model.  
 
TABLE 1 
The survey was administered over the Internet and panellists were mailed a 
postal notice about their selection into the panel together with instructions to fill out the 
questionnaire. Panellists who have registered in the first wave were invited and 
eventually reminded to participate in the second wave by several e-mail reminders (see 
Høgestøl and Skjervheim 2014 for details). As an incentive, participants were entered 




An experimental design was chosen to answer the hypotheses on influence of issue, 
temporal, and spatial scale. The experimental method was chosen in order to produce 
reliable estimates of the effects of the changes in the policy scenarios. The alternative, 
i.e. asking people to evaluate all of the scenarios, introduces risks of consistency bias, 
i.e. that responses to later scenarios will be influenced by preceding scenarios. 
Therefore, the sample was randomized into eight subgroups. Each of the eight groups 
received a single question on degree of agreement with the use of public funds to 
finance environmental policy measures.  
The scenarios had three attributes – spatial scale, timing, and targeted risks (air 
pollution or climate change). There were two distinct levels in each attribute, thus 
constituting a 2*2*2 full factorial design. The items asked about risk reduction of either 
climate change or local air pollution (issue attribute), and either in Norway or in the 
world (spatial attribute). They would also be implemented either immediately, or in 50 
years (timing). All possible combinations of these attributes (8 in total) were worded 
identically (e.g. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
Norwegian public funds should be spent on measures that reduce the risk of climate 
change in Norway immediately). Each respondent was presented with only one 
combination. The responses were indicated on 7-point Likert-type scale, from ‘strongly 
disagree’ (1) via ‘neither agree nor disagree’ (4) to ‘strongly agree’ (7).3 
 With the exception of a negligible proportion of item non-response, no missing 
values were present in the dependent variable. The distribution of the dependent 
 
3 Question codes: w02_km202a to h; original question wording in Online Appendix B. 
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variable for the specific combinations of attributes in each randomized group is 
presented in Figure 1. A binary variable was constructed by dividing the dependent 
variable in two categories – agrees (three points on the scale) and does not agree (four 
points including the mid-point). As can be seen in Figure 1, the distribution supports 
this division since few respondents chose the mid-point category. 
The effect of the experimental treatments and their interactions was assessed by 
regression models. Since the dependent variable is ordinal, both ordinal regression 
(proportional odds) with the original variable and binary logistic regression with the 
dichotomized version were calculated.  Because the results of both models are 
essentially uniform (with one exception commented on below), we present coefficients 
for the binary logistic model to simplify the interpretation. 
The basic model included only dummy variables representing the policy 
attributes and their levels. The full model included dummy variables and their 
interactions. Inclusion of the interaction terms yielded higher values of variance 
inflation factor (VIF) and lower values of tolerance, posing some possible 
multicollinearity issues if stricter criteria were applied. For this reason, we omit the full-
factorial model from interpretation.  
To measure self-reported political orientation, we recoded answers on a 11-point 
left-right scale4 into three groups of respondents – those who answered one of the four 
points on either the left or right end of the scale were coded as having ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
political orientations, respectively. The rest of the respondents (three middle points) 
were coded as ‘centre oriented’. 
 




Agreement with funding 
In general, wide majorities of the respondents were willing to spend public funds on 
reducing risks from either climate change or air pollution (between 70% and 87%, see 
Figure 1). Only minorities expressed downright disagreement.  The shares of 
respondents choosing one of the three scale points of agreement are fairly consistent 
among most of the scenarios (see Figure 1 for confidence intervals). All four delayed 
action scenarios tend to elicit greater agreement in general than all immediate scenarios 
with the exception of reducing air pollution risks in Norway immediately. 
FIGURE 1 
Thus, at first sight, these general policy attitudes seem to be quite stable. There 
are, however, some interesting differences between experimental groups – delayed 
action elicited slightly greater agreement in all but one scenario. It is also notable that 
homeland air pollution risk reduction has greater endorsement than global action. We 
therefore further explore how exactly time and space attributes influence respondents’ 
answers.  
Out of the three experimental treatments, only the effect of change in timing is 
statistically significant in the basic logistic regression model without interactions (Table 
2). The odds that one would agree rather than not are lower by 33% (significant at the 
0.05 level) if the scenario is to reduce risks immediately compared to in 50 years. The 
coefficients for treatments of spatial level and issue are not statistically significant in 
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this model.5 Overall, there is a tendency to evaluate local reductions more positively, 
but this result is not robust. Without considering interactions then, it would appear that 
people generally prefer policies tackling environmental problems in the distant future 
and that type of risk and spatial distance does not matter. 
TABLE 2 
Interaction of scenario attributes 
Once interaction terms are introduced in the regression model (Tables 2 and 3 in 
the Online Appendix), the interpretation of the main effects changes. These coefficients 
now measure an effect of change in the given attribute, while both other attributes are 
zero. If we recalculate the models with all possible codings of the binary independent 
variables, the intercepts of these recalculated models provide baseline odds, i.e. odds for 
different scenarios (with no change in the attributes). The values of baseline odds 
generally correspond with evaluations of the scenarios as seen in Figure 1. The scenario 
of reducing risks of air pollution in 50 years in Norway was most often positively 
evaluated and respondents receiving this combination of attribute levels have also 
almost eight times higher odds of agreeing with funding such a policy than not agreeing. 
Reducing the risk of air pollution immediately on the global level, on the other hand, 
was the least positively evaluated scenario.  
 
5 In the ordinal regression model, however, the coefficient for change in the spatial level is 
statistically significant (Exp(B)=0,780***). This discrepancy is caused by differences in 
distributions of answers under these two conditions. Specifically, whereas for global 
reduction more people have chosen the mid-point category, for reduction in Norway more 
people decided for slight disagreement, while both of these categories are merged in the 
binary model. These differences were evident in a series of binary logistic regressions with 
the dependent variable dichotomized at various cut points. 
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The coefficients for main effects indicate greater effect of temporal and spatial 
attributes in the air pollution scenarios, while main effects of changing time and space 
variables in the climate change scenarios are not statistically significant for the most 
part. In other words, agreement with funding air pollution risk reduction is more 
susceptible to the spatial and temporal characteristics of the scenario.  
Greater agreement with delayed action is found for both environmental issues. 
First, the odds for the second most positively evaluated policy scenario, i.e. reducing 
risks of air pollution in Norway immediately, is 38% lower in comparison with in 50 
years from now (scenario e→scenario g). Similarly, if the time horizon changes from 50 
years to now in the case of reducing risks of local air pollution globally, the odds of 
agreeing is 37% lower. The effects in climate change scenarios are not statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level in the binary logistic model; they are, however, statistically 
significant at that level in ordinal regression model (see Tables 5 to 9 in Online 
Appendix) and generally confirm the overall effect of changing the time horizon. The 
effect of change in the time horizon is stable (see Figure 3). Neither of the two possible 
interactions of this factor has a statistically significant effect.  
Second, policies for reducing the risks of local air pollution in either 50 years or 
immediately are less positively evaluated if the risks are to be reduced in the world 
rather than Norway alone. Odds of agreement in the world-wide air pollution scenario 
are 49% lower than for national scenarios. In the case of climate change, however, there 
is only a hint of an opposite effect of the change in the spatial attribute, and neither 
coefficient is statistically significant.  
Similarly, for reducing risks in Norway, air pollution elicits higher shares of 
agreement than climate change. If the issue at hand is not air pollution but climate 
change in the national context, the odds are lower by 45% and 52% for acting now and 
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in 50 years respectively. Agreement with funding local air pollution risk reduction is 
much stronger when confined to Norway. Since air pollution was formulated as ‘local’, 
respondents may not have been very keen to fund its reduction throughout the world or, 
in other words, outside Norway.  On the other hand, there are no strong, statistically 
significant effects for issue change at the global level. 
The two effects present in the air pollution scenarios, i.e. greater agreement with 
delayed and local action, reinforce each other. This reinforcement results in the largest 
difference across all eight the scenarios, ‘air pollution in Norway in 50 years’ being the 
most often approved scenario while the ‘air pollution in the world immediately’ is the 
least frequently approved one. This suggests that air pollution is perceived as locally 
bounded. 
Agreement with spending on reducing risks of climate change appears to be 
more consistent between the experimental conditions, although the idea of reducing 
these risks in Norway immediately elicits lower shares of agreement. Again, this is 
presumably a result of reinforcement between the two tendencies to delay action and 
assign climate change as an issue to the global rather than the national level, but the 
effects are too small to arrive at any robust conclusion.  
 FIGURE 2 
Political orientation 
Our results in general support the expected relationship of political orientation and 
policy attitudes. Almost all risk reduction spending scenarios appear less acceptable for 
those who claim to be oriented to the right compared to those who incline to the left (see 
Figure 3). The only exception is the proposition to reduce risks of air pollution in 
Norway in 50 years, to which around 90% of the respondents from all three groups 
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provided affirmative responses – this lack of differentiation may be due to a ceiling 
effect. Centre-oriented respondents usually do not statistically significantly differ from 
respondents either on the left or right, and their shares answering positively are in the 
mid-range between the other two groups.  
FIGURE 3 
In line with the results of the model without political orientation, air pollution 
scenarios elicit more agreement than climate change scenarios if the policy is said to be 
local. In all analysed population segments, climate change scenarios have odds lower at 
most by 56% (left; in 50 years) and at least by 40% (centre; acting now). Nonetheless, 
the same issue change in global policy schemes has no statistically significant effect. 
The regression results reveal some interesting differences in how different segments 
evaluate proposed scenarios (see Tables 2 to 4 in Online Appendix). Both those on the 
right and on the left have lower odds of agreement if the air pollution scenario changes 
from the national to the global level (by 58% and 60%, respectively, for right and left 
orientation in the delayed action scenario, and by 57% and 60%, respectively, in the 
acting now scenario; all significant at the 5% level). Changing the spatial attribute from 
the national to the global level does not affect the attitudes in the climate change 
scenarios, with the exception of centre-oriented respondents. In both the ‘delayed 
action’ and ‘acting now’ scenarios, the odds of agreement almost double among centre-
oriented respondents (statistically significant at the 1% level).  Moreover, scenarios of 
funding air pollution risk reduction in Norway and in the world are more likely to be 
endorsed by those with centrist political orientation if delayed, rather than being 
implemented immediately. In both cases, the odds of agreement are higher by more than 
40% if the scenario proposes a delay of 50 years. 
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  Discussion 
For air pollution, local focus increases agreement with public spending, while 
agreement with climate change scenarios is more strongly related to delay. Although air 
pollution and climate change are issues related through emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion, people perceive these issues differently in relation to the spatial attribute of 
their risk reductions - positive evaluations of funding measures reducing risks of climate 
change are higher in the global context, compared to air pollution scenarios. The more 
prevalent positive attitudes toward domestic air pollution risk reduction make sense if 
we consider that public funds used to finance risk-reducing measures are national. 
Moreover, using them to reduce global risks implies a burden-sharing rule based on 
wealth and capacity, rather than one based on the polluter-pays principle. There is some 
evidence that people tend to be prone to self-serving bias and prefer international 
distribution of costs that implies lower costs to their own country (Carlsson et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, national policy may be seen as more appropriate to tackle local air 
pollution rather than such a complex and global problem as climate change, where 
global solutions are needed. Indeed, it appears that Norwegian preferences are more in 
line with the idea of global cost-effectiveness in climate change mitigation, whereby 
funds are to be spent wherever they give the most effect (Kriegler et al., 2018).  
Comparing the results obtained by the models presented here, it is clear that 
some of the effects we found in the first model with interactions are specific to certain 
segments of population. Namely, delayed action, compared to immediate risk reduction, 
is more often endorsed by those in the centre; this only holds for air pollution, however. 
Respondents politically oriented to the left or to the right do not seem to react 
differently on these scenarios. On the other hand, they seem to react to the spatial 
attribute of the air pollution scenarios – agreeing more often with funding of domestic 
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rather than global risk reduction. A complementary effect occurs in the scenarios of risk 
reduction in Norway. Here, funding air pollution risk reduction rather than climate 
change mitigation elicits greater agreement among those in the centre and on the right.  
Consistently with previous evidence, those with left-leaning political orientation 
are more likely to agree with public funding of air pollution and climate change risk 
reduction, even in a country with pervasively positive attitudes. This difference is, 
however, not a straightforward polarization. Out of 1,714 respondents, 42% are 
politically oriented to the centre. Attitudes of this significant and large group spread 
between the other two and thus there is a continuum, rather than a clear bifurcation of 
public opinion. Interestingly, climate change seems not to be a divisive issue in any 
scenario. Although agreement with air pollution scenarios varies in response to some 
scenario attributes conditionally on political orientation, this variation is not polarized. 
Those on the left and on the right seem to react to the spatial attribute of the air 
pollution scenarios in a similar fashion.   
The overall pervasive willingness to use public funds to reduce risks of air 
pollution and climate change in all scenarios, and to reduce climate change risks in the 
world specifically, allow for some positive expectations with respect to public attitudes 
toward environmental and climate policies. The results further support the previous 
conclusions on the relevance of global climate change framing despite the assumption 
that people see it as a distant threat that does not affect them (e.g. Spence and Pidgeon 
2010). Although a lack of locally and personally relevant information can be a barrier to 
behavioural change or action (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, and Whitmarsh 2007), it 
does not mean that global framing and information on global impacts are irrelevant and 
not helpful. This implies that to be effective, the information should emphasise existing 
values people hold, their beliefs about their own responsibility to act or to contribute 
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(Krosnick et al. 2006) and their mental representations of climate change (Bostrom et al. 
2012). These representations could be framed both locally and globally. In fact, the two 
levels are very likely to interact, especially with regard to sense of belonging and 
attachment, and it could be misleading to cast them as discrete (Devine-Wright, Price, 
and Leviston 2015). Not only can people see distant consequences as more serious 
(Spence and Pidgeon 2010), but are also more likely to act upon relevant pro-
environmental attitudes if primed by a distant-future time perspective (see also Brügger, 
Morton, and Dessai 2016). These results, as well as ours presented in this study, 
generally support the notion that climate change can be narrated as both a global and a 
local issue without substantial losses of policy support, especially in populations that are 
inclined to agree with public spending in the domain in general.  
The high shares of respondents agreeing with public spending in our experiment 
probably reduced the variance of responses in different experimental conditions. The 
skewed distributions are presumably a product of the general nature of the policy 
proposals, which did not include any information on the amount of public spending or 
on individual costs to the respondents. These are important determinants of policy 
attitudes (Bord et al., 2000) and would probably decrease the agreement with policy 
funding. Thus, the relevance of spatial, temporal, and issue contexts may in fact 
increase for more specific measures, suggesting that our findings are conservative 
estimates of the effects of the various experimental conditions. 
Conclusion 
We started this paper by asking three research questions. First, we asked whether the 
previously demonstrated tendency to see climate change as a temporally and spatially 
distant threat also held for policy action, and notably for preferences over public 
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spending.  Second, we asked whether these earlier findings of the perceived spatial and 
temporal remoteness of climate risks are due to a general preference to postpone action 
on any environmental issue. We introduced the contrast between air pollution and 
climate change to address this issue. Third, we asked to what extent political ideology 
would play a role in explaining variation in support for spending on risk reduction in 
various temporal and spatial scenario combinations. This last question was motivated by 
an interest in examining whether findings from the US would also apply in Europe.  
To answer our research questions, we investigated public responses to general 
policy scenarios dealing with public funding of climate change and air pollution risk 
reductions. In an experimental design, we examined whether public responses to these 
scenarios would vary depending on spatial and temporal attributes of the scenarios and 
whether this variation would be issue specific to climate change or also hold in the 
context of air pollution. Moreover, we were interested in whether this variation is 
conditional on the political orientation of the respondents. 
First, we found that preferences for responses to air pollution and climate change 
differ. The difference found in attitudes towards the two types of risks is particularly 
pronounced in the spatially and temporally proximate condition as seen in the second 
panel of Figure 2. In this scenario, endorsement of spending on air pollution is 
substantively and significantly higher than for spending on climate change.  
Respondents have in other words more positive attitude toward spending to reduce air 
pollution risks in Norway now than they have toward spending to reduce climate change 
risks in Norway now.   
Second, we found that spatial proximity influences attitudes toward spending to 
reduce climate change and air pollution risks differently.  In the case of air pollution 
risks, the spatially proximate, national, scenarios elicit most positive attitudes. For 
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climate change, the pattern is the opposite. Attitude is more positive in the spatially 
distant, global, scenarios. Thus, extending the earlier literature on differences in 
perceived causes and impacts of air pollution and climate change (Tvinnereim et al., 
2017), we also find differences across these two environmental issues.  
Third, some of these effects were conditional on political orientation, and effects 
of respondents’ left-right self-placement on policy attitudes were particularly clear for 
scenarios that were more remote in time or space. Achieving public-wide support could 
therefore mean making trade-offs between different values held by different groups 
(Shwom, Bidwell, Dan, and Dietz 2010). However, the effects were somewhat different 
from those seen in existing research based mainly on US data. Specifically, we found 
little evidence of clear political polarization among the Norwegian public with respect 
to environmental policy attitudes. Funding climate change risk reduction seems not to 
be a divisive issue in any of our experimental conditions. On the other hand, agreement 
with air pollution scenarios varies conditionally on political orientation, but this 
variation is not polarized. Rather, consensus prevails among Norwegians with respect to 
public funding of environmental risk reduction. 
Most importantly, our results indicate that even though the public shows a 
greater affinity for delaying spending in many cases, the type of environmental problem 
matters. In particular, attitudes were more positive toward spending on climate change 
risk reduction in the global context, whereas attitudes toward air pollution mitigation 
were more positive in the national context. As regards policy implications and 
communication, this suggests that emphasising local over global action on climate 
change may not necessarily enhance public acceptance, unless the action also 
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